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TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE HELD BY MR. EDMUND WELLENSTEIN 
DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL TRADE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C. ON MARCH 5, 1970 u (f D 31 q11f, -, / 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Mr. Wellenstein: Good morning. First, I would like to explain the nature 
of the visit the Common Market delegation has paid to Washington these past 
days, at the invitation of tile United States Government. It is avisit in 
a series of current contacts that have taken place for a number of years now, 
but with a certain increased intensity these last times about mutual trade 
problems. We have had American cabinet members and undersecretaries in 
Brussels in the past month. There have been contacts between Secretary 
Hardin and Dr. Mansholt, our agricultural Commissioner, and this time 
Mr. Deniau, Commissioner responsible for foreign trade, has come to Washington 
at the invitation of the United States. The aim of such a visit is not to 
negotiate anything, or to settle anything concret~ly, but just to make a tour 
d'horizon of all kinds of affairs being discussed in different frameworks, 
either in GATT or in UNCTAD or anywhere else, and to try to pave the way 
for sensible solution for the many kinds of problems that arise. 
Now there are two orders of problems. First, a normal amount of trade 
friction on more or less important specific points bound to arise between 
trade entities of this size. Indeed, the Community and the United States 
are the two biggest single trade entities in the world, and it would be 
amazing if they did not have a number of current, little troubles that have 
to be settled and reasonably resolved in order to prevent them from growing 
beyond their proper proportions. Second, there are a number of world-wide 
problems in which the United States and the Community; because of their size 
- 2 -
and their importance, play an essential role. Of these, we can say that 
a solution can be found if the United States and the Community plus, in 
these times, Japan and other important nations, come to a common approach. 
But you can't solve them if they do not do that. The Kennedy Round was 
aa important example in recent history. 
GENERAL PREFERENCES 
We have now what I think is a most important affair before us the general 
... 
preferences scheme for underdeveloped nations. There are, of course, other 
subjects that are drawing much attention here now, such as certain agreements 
that the Community has concluded in the Mediterranean, or that it is negotiating 
that are in conformity with GATT, but which seem to cause concern in the 
United States and about which an explanation seems to be very appropriate at 
this time. That's about the nature of the problems we discussed.. If I may 
speak of the smaller points of friction, you know, for example, that some 
aspects of the common agricultural policy of the Community cause concern 
in the United States. We discussed this intensely, of course, as we always 
do. On our side we are very eager to see the full Kennedy Round implemented 
and to see that ASP will at last be abolished, which would pave the way· for 
further steps and trade liberalizations that are now under study. And there 
are some matters about custom duties that have been increased in the United 
States for instance on some woolen products from the Community. We went through 
all these; and, on a number of points, I think these exchanges really were very 
useful, not because they led to an immediate settlement but because they 
created the prospect for a fruitful discussion in the future. If I may say 
one final word about the overall situation, we had the feeling, and we tried 
to draw attention to that over here, that sometimes through the trees we n9 
longer see the woods. People concentrate so much on specific issues which 
interest them that they tend to forget that if you.look at U.S.-Coromunity 
- 3 -
-
trade relations and economic relations as a whole, it's probably the most 
satisfactory part of world trade relations that you can find. Statistics 
are there to prove it. We gave out a little paper to recall these figures, 
and this was only to put things in their proper perspective and not have 
people believe that everything is only disaster. In brief, we feel that 
this visit has been extremely useful. It's much better to talk about things 
directly than to shout at each other over the Atlantic without direct contact. 
Thank you very much. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
Q. Where is Mr. Deniau? 
A. He was invited by the American Ambassador to the Community to join in 
a ~eminar in Aspen where he will spend a few days, and then he goes back 
to Europe, as we do tonight. 
ASP 
Q~ Mr. Wellenstein, did you get any assurance -- if this is the correct 
word -- about ASP. When and how it will be abolished? 
A. I don't think you can talk about assurance on such a matter which depends 
on legislation.· We found that, on the American side, people are as aware 
as we are of the extreme importance of the matter, not only in itself but 
also as an essential element that is necessary if we want to keep things 
moving in the future. 
GENERALIZED PREFERENCES 
Q. Did you make any progress on the question of preferences, any new 
approach ••• ? 
A. I would say that, indeed, we made some progress •. We found, as you often 
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find,that although one thinks that the other side has understood your view-
point perfectly well, there are still quite a number of points on which 
there are misunderstandings, either as to the nature of the U.S. scheme or 
the Community's scheme, Although different in their technicalities, they 
are not necessarily so far apart in their economic impact. We found that 
on the American side convictionP~as as strong as on our side that this is· 
one of the most important problems of world trade policy and must be settled 
within a very reasonable per'iod of time. There was a willingness to look 
at it in this spirit and to appreciate each other's efforts; to find that, 
if they led to comparable results, it was perhaps not .so necessary that 
they coincide in every detail, Situations may be different. There may be 
reasons not to adopt the same technically exact plans. Trade legislation, 
for instance, in the United States is different from ours. So it may not 
be possible in every detail to have exactly the same plan. What is important 
is that the plans have the same economic impact and that the burdens th~t 
are borne by the two parties and by all the other industrialized nations 
in the world are comparable in relation to their size. 
Q. Was any agreement reached, Sir, on one of the basic differences ••• the 
difference between the .United States generalized world-wide system for all 
countries and,what I understand to be the EEC approach, to retain historical 
preferences for certain countries? 
A. I am glad you asked that question, because it is not a different approach.· 
It is a different situation. Both our approaches are what we need. What's 
more, it has been politically promised to the underdeveloped countries: within 
a short time a general preference scheme which will profit all underdeveloped 
countries in the same way as your general one. We have a number of cases 
I 
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which, as you said, stem from the historical links that certain under-
developed countries had with Conununity member countries. These had a 
preferential access, quite legitimately, to certain markets. I would have 
been really inequitable to take it away from them. So, what happened when 
the Community was founded was that these historical preferences were trans-
a 
formed to/Conununity basis, and they have taken the form of agreements with 
the Conununity. It is not our intention to make that into a system which 
would spread over the whole vrnrld. It is a limited number of cases that 
have been settled this way. They all have to come up before GATT. They can 
be examined in GATT. The contracting parties can have their say about it, 
and we are handling them according to normal existing procedures. 
Q. But you would agree that the same preferences should go to all under-
developed countries, irrespective of historical links? 
A. The general preference scheme must be absolutely general, that's right. 
Q. Must be absolutely general? Is that eventually, or in a relatively near 
future,;; when the scheme is initiated? 
A\ Yes, when the scheme is initiated. 
Q. How can you get preferences if the United States says you can't have them 
on textiles and you take your historical preferences on other countries. What 
chances do you really have that they will make any inroads toward:preferences 
in the first place. I mean, when do you envision some concrete results in 
this respect? 
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A. Textiles? 
Q. Not necessarily textiles, preferences of any kind for any industry for 
underdeveloped countries if the United States says you can't do it with textiles, 
if you take historical preferences of certain countries or other industries, 
when can we expect some concrete results? 
A. Well, I think we must distinguish. The general preference scheme is for 
'• 
manufactured and semi-manufactured products. The number of agreements you 
refer to, which we have with some countries, are with countries which do not 
yet produce any manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. So in the agreements 
we have, for instance, with the African countries, there are certain 
advantages; but they are in no way the same as wheat they would get from a 
general preference scheme, because it is a matter of products. 
Q. In other words, we'll start them off from the beginning. You don't make 
any manufactured or semi-manufactured products, we start you from there. So 
therefore you are not getting any preference in the first place. You don't 
do it, therefore, you are not getting any preference? 
A. No, the moment they make those goods, they will have the preferences; but 
as I said, for the moment it is not very interesting for them because they 
do not make those goods. 
PROTECTIONIST ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES 
Q. What did you find about the overall protectionist attitude of the United 
States in your talks here? 
A. We have, of course, been alarmed and preoccupied by a number of bills that 
-----------'---~----"-'-' -~;:.·. -.· -~-----~-.--. ....-.._...-..,---.~.--~ 
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have been presented in the past. We found in our talks that we are in 
full agreement with the U.S. Administration. If either one of us makes 
a big inroad into the normal rules of trade, it could lead to a chain of 
reaction and would be extremely dangerous. One cannot envisage that one 
party does it without the other retaliating in some way or other. It's 
as true for us as well as for the United States. 
TEXTILES 
Q. If the United States is ~egotiating on textiles, if it should get a so-
called voluntary agreement, with Japan and the other exporting textile 
nations to the U.S., if it should get what it is seeking, how would you view 
that, would that be protectionist? 
A. It would depend entirely on the content of the agreement. 
Q. Well let's just assume that in the ball park of the long-term cotton 
textile arrangement, let's assume, balanced growth and all the other things 
that this allows for ••• how would you view that? 
A. I think the question is not there. The question is whether the arrangement, 
which is a matter in the first place between the United States and Japan, and 
not our affair ••• 
Q ...• Other than Japan, I mean Japan is just an opening. 
A. If the arrangement is one which relates to concrete difficulties that arise 
within the United States or anywhere else and it aims at eliminating or alleviating 
those difficulties, this would not be in contradiction to the general principles 
of trade policy. A global arran6ement without any reference to specific 
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difficulties would be another matter. If I understand the situation, 
that's what the Japanese are worried about, making a general arrangement 
for a whole sector without reference to specific difficulties that have 
to be solved. 
Q. Well, they are working for a general arrangement. I mean, they are 
just talking with Japan because they want bilateral agreements with 
individual countries, but they're certainly working toward a world 
arrangement. So, in that light, would this be; in your view or in the view 
of the Common Market, protectionist? 
A. It depends on the content of what you call the world arrangement. First 
of all, it is quite clear that the textile issue does not interest only the 
United States and a number of countries in the Far-East -- Japan, Korea, and 
others. The textile issue is a very lively one in world trade policy because 
it is one of the main products of underdeveloped countries. So, if between 
Japan and the others and the United States something is worked out, no doubt 
it would have to be looked at on the international level with the other 
interested countries. Now, if it is protectionist or not depends on the 
content of the agreement that will be reached, not on the number of countries 
that participate. If it is an agreement which copes with specific difficulties 
and aims at alleviating specific difficulties that arise from imports and 
which put people in trouble, this would not be in contradiction with the 
general philosophy of trade policy. 
Q. In other words, the United States can reach an agreement with Japan, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Formosa, other exporting countries, to limit specific 
exports to the United States in the same general principle of long-term 
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cotton textile arrangement, and this would not necessarily be protectionist? 
A. May I put it another way? If on the way to solve these textile problems, 
a consensus is worked out between the United States and these other countries, 
no doubt the matter will have to come up on the international level, because 
there are many other interested countries. You could not envisage some 
partners doing things that are completely different from what other partners 
do. So it would have to come up internationally anyhow. The point for the 
'" 
moment is on what kind o'f formula the discussion will be. 
Q. Are you trying to disti~guish between temporary controls to see American 
industry over a difficult period and long-term permanent controls? 
A. I think the differences are rather between specific measures for specific 
difficulties, which are in conformity with the general philosophy of trade 
policy, or overall measures even before specific difficulties in a certain 
product or a certain group of products have been demonstrated. That's 
the difference. 
PROTECTIONISM 
the 
Q. Were you disturbed abou~ protectionist attitude of the United States at 
all, or do you think that this is a passing fancy, a fad, or of such proportions 
that you could be disturbed? 
A. I said before that we have been very preoccupied about the different bills 
that have been proposed and we of course continue to consider this the most 
important. aspect. If the United States gives in to these pressures, there is 
no question that other countries will have to tal(2 similar measures. So, 
in this sense, we are disturbed. If you &sk: did we find comprehension for 
this viewpoint here, that it ,, 't be that one big partner in world trade 
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does restricted things and the others maintain a liberal policy?, on this 
we found full comprehension. 
Q. Mr. Wellenstein, so far you have been talkir.g about A.~erican protectionism, 
but during your talks here, did protectionism in the Common Market come up? 
A. I did not hear the word, but I mentioned before that among the things 
which we discussed were certain effects of the common agricultural policy. 
They were b_rought up, certainly. 
TAX ON THE VALUE ADDED (TVA) 
Q. About the value-added tax and your non-tariff barriers, did the United 
States officials complain about that? Did you make any concessions in that 
light. What was discussed in that area? 
A. I think there is a much fuller understanding today that the value-added 
tax is in no way a non-tariff barrier. It has nothing to do with non-tariff 
barriers. It is a tax which is paid by everyone, importer or exporter. 
Q. Did the U.S. officials see this as a non-tariff barrier? 
A. We had, with several U.S.,officials, tal~s which seem to us that they 
see this in the proper light; yes. 
Q. Did they ask you to take any action with regard to the TVA in the 
Community countries? 
A. You know the TVA and its effects are before a working group in GATT. 
That work certainly goes on.. I think the discussion has narrowed down 
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to a small margin today. It used to be that our entire tax system, as such, 
was under discussion. I do no.t think that's the standpoint any more. What 
we ·now speak about is about certain marginal effects of introducing new tax 
systems on trade. That's a completely different subj~ct. 
Q. When you refer to introducing new taxes, Sir, you mean increasing the 
effective rates of the TVA? 
... 
A. No. That's not the point because the effective rates are always pa.id as 
much by the inland producers as by those who import. So that's not the 
point at all. The point is whether under the previous tax system there was 
full compensation, whether they paid exactly the same amount when they 
imported as paid the inland producers. In certain cases, there was not 
a full identity because our previous systems were less good than the present 
one. We have now a full identity between what the importer pays and what 
the inland producer pays. So there may have been a small shift -- a small 
one -- between the comparison of what an importer and the inland producer 
paid previously to what they pay now. The discussion narrowed down to that 
margin. 
Q. If the United States were to enact a value-added tax to replace part of 
the present corporate income tax, would the European Common Market consider 
this a protectionist tax? 
A. Absolutely not. Because it is a neutral tax. 
Q. In other words, they ..... you answered the question. 
---- ~---------~~----========.=:==== 
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British Entry 
Q. Was there any discussion of the indications one had some time ago 
discussion on United Kingdom and other countries' entry in the EEC -- that 
it would have the effect of significantly delaying progress in GATT, which 
I would think the United States was interested in making, let's say at the 
beginning of or during 1971, in a significant way?· Has this entry discussion, 
in effect, delayed significant progress in GATT on NTB's or agricultural matters? 
A. I don It think so. I don,'.t think so. Of course the point of British entry, 
etc. was discussed because it is one of the points in the foreground at the 
present time. A discussion in GATT about the speed at which you tackle NTB's 
amd other problems is not at all linked to that problem. May I ask perhaps 
Mr .. _Hij zen to say a few words, because ht: was in Geneva when these talks 
took place 10 days ago. 
Mr. ·Hijzen - I know there was some expectations that we would have decided 
that there would be negotiations in 1971. It was in the press before. The 
reason why we could not take that decision has never been discussed, anyhow 
not by us. Perhaps someone has it in mind. In light of the adhesion of the 
British, the arguments we had for this were of purely practical character. 
At this time when the preparatory work has still to be done it would be 
recognized in GATT .. It's absolutely too early to say now exactly what you're 
going to do in 1971, exactly in such technical, very complicated matters as 
non-tariff barriers and agriculture. It has nothing to do with policies, it's 
simply a question of technics. 
Q. As far as you are concerned, therefore, the discussions on entry of other 
countries is not a causal factor in the main progress in GATT? 
GENERALIZED PREFERENCES 
Q. You said earlier that it is urgent to get some agreement on the general 
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preferences for LDC's in a very reasonable time. Then a moment later 
you said that these general preferences would be limited to manufactures 
and semi-manufactures which many of the LDC's don't market. I don't 
understand why it's necessary to get the agreement so urgently. 
A~ Well, sir, the broad nature of the generalized preferences scheme was 
one that was decided on in UNCTAD between the underdeveloped and the 
developed nations, in two big conferences. You remember the last one was 
two years ago. They came to'"'these broad approaches: there will be 
generalized preferences for semi-manufactured and manufactured products; 
they will be discussed; and, as quickly as possible, they will be put into 
effect. On transformed agricultural products, all developed countries 
will submit a list, a limited list, of which products they can give 
preferences. There we do not have agreement that we would have a general 
across-the-board preference. That's the point. So the scheme concentrates 
on manufactured and semi-manufactured products, since at the outset that is 
how it was conceived. Mr. Wellenstein: May I add a word to that? You 
spoke of not being interested, but we were speaking about the very poorest 
countries in Africa, which has a very small industry. But there are a lot 
of other countries which a~e very much interested. 
Q. And that's where the urgency comes from. 
Q. Could you na~e any industries, j~st as an example, that might be included 
in a preferential scheme? 
A. In our scheme, all industries are included, all sectors. That's one of 
the difference with the scheme of the United States. In the proposal that 
the United States submitted, there are excepted sectors: textiles, shoes ••• 
Q. Textiles wouldn't be on this basis ... (Mr. Hijzen: why not?.) 
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Because the United States, the State Department, has already said that 
they won't be. 
Mr. Hijzen: Yes, that's why I said ... 
Q. So, they will be. I mean if textiles won't be, what will be? 
A. There are two plans. There is the U.S.plan, which has been submitted to 
the OECD, which will be submitted to underdeveloped countries and will be 
discussed. It is a scheme'-Which provides for generalized preferences, 
with three exceptions: textiles, shoes, oil and oil products, plus a 
safeguard clause. A preference is franchised, full franchise of duty, 
zero duties, but a safeguard clause that could be denied. Our scheme has 
no ·exceptions, all sectors are included, textiles also, shoes also; no 
safeguard clause, but a system .in which if imports under the preference 
scheme go beyond a certain·point, we could put an end to the preferences, 
not to the import, but to the preference. So they are two different 
technical schemes, both,with limitations but different limitations. 
Q. Sir, when do you expect something to happen on this? 
A. Our feeling is that it is not necessary, nor feasible, nor good for the 
underdeveloped countries if we try to fully harmonize these systems. Our 
feeling is that what we have to harmonize are the burdens that each one of 
us carries. If these burdens would be unequal the situation of course would 
become intolerable. We hav:s to take a comrnitment that the schemes, and the 
way we apply them, lead to the sharing of the burden in an equitable way. 
There may be good reasons for the United States to have excepted textiles, 
for instance, from this scheme. We diq not have to except them, so we have 
them in. There is no reason that we should except them also. 
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Q. What you seem to be saying when you say all industries except textiles, 
shoes, and oil In other words, you are not going to give any arrangement 
that is worked out which would be for part bias in those industries. 
In other words you're simply saying, and correct this if I'm wrong, that it 
will be a certain amount of the market of each industrialized nation •.• 
In other words, you can produce up to a certain point, but you just can'·t 
develop this industry.~ roduce it full blast, and export what you can. Arn 
I right or am I wrong in this1 Are you saying that they will be granted a 
certain amount of the market of an industrialized nation? 
A. Our scheme is not in terms of market shares. That's not it. We said 
you can get a preference for the amounts you import already, plus an 
additional amount which about doubles the amount you import already, plus 
a growth rate. We only stop the preference beyond that level if there are 
difficulties. If there are no difficulties, it can go beyond. 
Q. What sort of difficulties? 
A. Well, the kind of difficulties that you read about in the press all the 
time, for instance, with the textile industries. 
ASP 
Q. Mr. Wellenstein, what will happen if Congress refuses to abolish ASP? 
A. I think that would be a very great setback for further proceedings in GATT, 
because ASP is not ASP on the American side. It entails certain adjustments 
on the taxation of automobiles, in Europe, which was an old United States claim. 
Well if the whole package goes down the dr~iJ, the package that was arranged 
in the Kennedy Round, the credibility of further moves 9f this kind, which 
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require Congressional approval, will have been reduced very considerably. 
For instance in the NTB's, for which all parties have drawn up long lists of 
what they would like to have disappear in other countries, customs evaluation 
is an important point for us. You know that the United States do not apply 
the same customs nomenclature that other countries apply, and that their 
customs evaluation varies from product to product. It can be nounal. It 
can be artificially high. That's one of our claims, that it should be 
adjusted over the whole line. ASP was the most important example of this 
·-
kind of thing. If we talk about non-tariff barriers in general, this 
is the subject which ~ill come up. Now, if it is impossible to abolish 
ASP, even ~gainst the important concessions that go with it from our side, 
haw would it be possible to make progress on other, similar things? 
PROPOSED U.S. TRifuE ACT 
Q. Are there any other elements in the trade proposals of the President 
to Congress that caused you any difficulty or great concerns? Excuse me, 
I would like to re-phrase the question. Do you approve of all the other 
elements in the trade proposals maG.2 by the President? 
we 
A. It is not for us to approve or disapprove, but I can say thadwere very 
glad when we read the trade biil. Apart from ASP, which is a mptter in 
itself, the bill, if it is adopted, will enable the United States to parti-
cipate more normally in the current work of GATT. Let me give an example: 
we have the increase of duties decided by Congress on certain woolen products. 
This was against. a commitment taken in GATT. ~ow this is permissible in GATT 
if you compensate the increase taken in this area, against wool, with a. 
decrease somewhere else. But the U.S. Administration simply has no possibility 
to make such adjustments. This of course· creates friction, and a small matter 
which otherwise could be easily settled stays on the books and creates bitterness, 
- 17 
and we do not get rid of it. So, the trade bill will be a great relief 
in that it gives a margin of maneuver to the Administration to settle 
such current affairs. And we were glad of it. Also the adjustment assistance 
we think is good. 
Q. Are there any elements which give you concern in the bill? 
A. No. 
. .. 
TEXTILES 
Q. Does the EEC have any intention, or would the EEC like to limit exports 
from the United States of man-made -;:c:: •• : Is there any concern in the 
EEC about U.S. exports? 
A. U.S. exports of man-made textiles? 
We are quite important importers of U.S. textiles, especially synthetic textiles. 
The figures are impressive, but I have heard about no claim to limit the amount on.· 
that. 
Q. What about preferences for South America, rather than the world as a whole. 
Did you agree to this, and what is your reaction to it? 
A. We would think that would be a very unhappy development. 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
Q. Sir, what specific aspects of the CAP came up during your discussions? 
A. May I ask Mr. von Verschuer to answer that. 
Mr. von Verschuer Well, we have a long list of specific problems in this 
field. I think that the overall situatio~ is that the United States claims 
that the common agricultural policy gives' too much support to farmers in 
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Europe. We claim that, under the actual conditions and with the social 
problems we have in the Community j_n the field of agriculture, this support 
for the time being is necessary, and we are looking for creating conditions 
under which it becomes possible to diminish this support. If you remember, 
the United States were in about the same situation 10 or 15 years ago. 
We have looked at the matter and the tendency is, I think, and we have 
a good hope, that this will go on, to try to live with the actual problems 
we have, which is a problem of oversupply for some of the ~ost important 
markets. 
Q. Have you thought of converting to the P .. Inerican system where you pay 
farmers not to grow things rather than paying them to grow things you 
can't sell? 
A. We touched on this question as well. Our American friends, especially 
in the Department of Agriculture, informed us about the measures actually 
contemplated or introduced for putting cereal acreage out of production. On 
our question, "what will be the result in terms of production volume?", the 
answer was that this will lead to a stabilized production volume, that means· 
avoid further increase. We explained that in Europe the situation is 
different because, u_p to now,. most of the farms which have mixed farming, 
producing different products. So it makes no sense to put out of production 
small acreages of grains production on each farm. What we are looking for 
is to create the necessary instruments and the necessary conditions for 
putting out of production fan:iers and farms. 
. ' Q. Mr. Wellenstein, in recent press reports the word ·"dumping" was used 
frequently. Was it used in your conversations here? 
A. No 
- 19 -
QUOTAS 
Q. If the Congress of the United States enacts any legislation setting 
quotas on imports of any large industry, do you think that this would be 
protectionist and it would cause retaliation from the Common Market? ••• 
Could this be accepted? I am thinking again of textiles specifically, 
because this is the one bill which is being considered. Wilbur Mills of 
the House Ways and Means Committee has made such a threat. 
A. We speak about a whole sector: quotas, globally isolating a wh.ole 
sector, an important sector, from normal rules of trade, that would be 
contrary to GATT. I do not see how pressure which also exists in other 
countries could be contained when you do similar things, perhaps, in 
other sectors. 
Q. What about steel-mill products? Is everyone satisfied with the voluntary· 
quota system of exports? 
A. We are not very satisfied with this kind of system because it sort of 
by-passes the normal proceedings for trade policy. At the moment, there 
has been a boom in steel for several years. There are really no practical 
problems over imports of steel. So, on the practical level, there is no 
problem. It's the principle we do not like. 
EEC PREFERENTIAL ARRAKGEYIENTS 
Q. What was the nature of your discussion concerning the proliferation of 
countries that have been associating themselves with the EEC under more or 
less preferential schemes? I believe it's a Mediterranean issue. 
A. We explained that we in no way intend, as one of,your colleagues said 
. : 
' 
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formally, to make this into a policy and to spread more and more into 
preferential arrangments with more and more countries. We explained that 
we had a number of specific cases, for the most part stemming from those 
historical links we spoke about, countries which had a right to preferential 
access into the Community or parts of the Community, which were transformed 
into Community agreements: plus a limited number of countries of similar 
economic structure bordering on those, and that's the Mediterranean. We 
explained that in no way did we intend, beyond those specific cases, to make 
this into a general policy. 
Q. Can you name the countries where you would end an application of a 
preferential relationship with the EEC? 
A. The Mediterranean border countries. 
Q. How about East-Africa, Sir? There was a preferential agreement this 
last year, wasn't there? The African countries are pretty far away from 
the Mediterranean. 
A. It exists yes. Itrs an existing case, yes. I thought the question was: 
will this go on and on? The existing cases are countries in Africa which 
had links which formed an economic whole formerly with France, with Italy, 
with Belgium. That's the African grou?, Years ago, some countries in 
Africa asked to benefit from more or less the same kind of system, that's 
East Africa. That exists. Now, the q:.,2stion is "where does this stop?" 
I say the answer is, it stops beyond the cases we have in the Mediterranean 
border countries. 
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Q. There are really two issues, as I understand it. One relates to the 
preferential scheme for LDC' s, and the· other relates to the more or less 
developed countries bordering the Mediterranean? 
A. Well, or more or less underdeveloped ••.. with Turkey and Greece 
we have a long-standing arrangement, for ~any years which aims, in time, 
at full membership in the Community. There are European countries, and they 
.• 
are eligible for membership. Only their economic development did not permit 
doing this in a very short time. But there is a timetable, in conformity with 
GATT, to make them, after a number of year, fully participants in the· 
Community. It 1 s a different case. 
Q. Shouldn't enlargement of the Common Market change that? Britain has 
trading relations with African countries and the Commonwealth countries which 
are rather widespread. Under this system, there is a possibility of spreading 
the preferences to a wider geographical area. 
A. You 1 re quite right, Sir, but that 1 s a problem that will come up. 
Q. It did not come up this week? 
A. No, it did not come up. 
Q. Sir, if the United Kingdom joins the Co~.munity, would you expect they 
would shift their food import from Coilli~onwealth suppliers to the EEC entirely? 
A. They have shifted their food import needs in history several times, from 
Argentina to Australia. There certainly will be other shifts again in the 
! 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
... 
- 22 -
future when it is part of the Common Market, it's quite normal. 
Q. Do you expect the Community will be the princicipal beneficiary of' that? 
A. (No answer). 
e 
Q. Was U.S. direct investments in Europe discussed? 
'• 
A. It was not so much discussed as we pointed out that if you look at the 
overall balance of economic relations, U.S. investments in Europe and the 
return on these investments which has become quite considerable in the 
meantime is a non-neglibible factor. 
Q. How will the EEC preference arr~::gement affect petroleum imports from 
North Africa wnd t~e Persian Gulf? 
A. There is no direct impact. Import of petrole~~ normally in our countries 
is free, with one exception, that is France, which has certain privileged 
sources, exactly those countries with which it had historical links. ·But 
I think the flow of petroleum from the 1-'Iidc.le East and f.rom North Africa 
into the Community will continue in the same way. 
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